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‘Since when’, he asked, 
‘Are the first line and last line of any poem 
Where the poem begins and ends?’1 
 
This essay investigates two of Seamus Heaney’s translations, The Cure at 
Troy (1990) and The Burial at Thebes (2004), teasing out their relationship to 
his aesthetic philosophy and the parallels present with Lacanian and 
Derridean analyses of symbolic and ethical structures. The epigraph above 
provides an appropriate starting point for considering this topic, because it 
suggests that the effects of a poem go beyond the boundary of the written 
page, which is one of a series of boundary crossings that will be discussed in 
this essay. Beginning with Heaney’s positioning of the space of poetry 
outside of social and political concerns, it will be argued that these 
translations are analogous with his artistic philosophy: in The Cure at Troy 
through the ideas expressed in its language, and in The Burial at Thebes 
through the events of the plot, which provide a symbolic counterpoint to 
Heaney’s concept of the space of poetry. This outside space will be explored 
firstly in relation to Jacques Derrida’s On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, in 
which he argues that the general principle of justice is located outside of 
juridicial and legal structures, echoing the moral debates of the play. It will 
also be analysed in relation to Jacques Lacan’s commentary on Antigone in 
Seminar VII. Lacan proposes that Antigone, on which Heaney’s translation is 
based, dramatizes an individual crossing from the realm of language and law 
into an intermediary space between life and death; transgressing the symbolic 
order and moving into the liminal space of the second death. 
 
Both plays are translations of Sophoclean drama: The Cure at Troy is based 
on Philoctetes and The Burial at Thebes on Antigone. Heaney changes the 
title of each to reflect the place and the action that define the play, rather 
than the principal character. Yet, Philoctetes and Antigone of course remain 
the central figures of the dramas, and the original titling of the plays after 
their name is undoubtedly justified. In Heaney’s translations, these 
characters play no less of a part than in their original incarnations in Greek 
drama. So, why does Heaney name these plays after the place in which they 
are set and the action that occurs there? This question gets the crux of 
inciting incident in both of the plays, and to the core of Heaney’s aesthetic 
philosophy. In both cases, the action is impelled by conflict between those 
who are faithful to the laws of the community, and those who rebel against 
them to pursue a sense of right that is personal, and which in both the case 
of Antigone and Neoptalmus, is believed to be beyond social law. In 
Heaney’s prose writings, he occasionally ponders the efficacy of poetry in the 
real world, and this is elaborated in a particularly interesting manner in The 
Government of the Tongue. The title of this set of memorial lectures has a 
two-fold, contradictory significance for Heaney. On one hand, it articulates 
the personally-sanctioned autonomy of the tongue to speak authoritatively 
and he states that, ‘In this reading, the tongue (representing both a poet’s 
personal gift of utterance and the common resources of language) has been 
granted a right to govern’ (Heaney 2002, 197). This right, he argues, is not 
ethical or moral; it is a separate system of meaning that stems from the 
individual: ‘the self validating operations of what we call inspiration’ (Heaney 
2002, 197). On the other hand, the government of the tongue implies 
restrictiveness and censorship: ‘a denial of the tongue’s autonomy and 
permission’ (Heaney 2002, 197). It is in this Derridean double-bind that the 
poetry is situated for Heaney, attached to the individual and the community; 
personal morality and social law, but not fully invested in any of these 
categories, instead retaining an element of separation and autonomy. It is 
here too, in the realm of these opposing forces and beyond them, that the 
dilemma of the Antigone and Neopthalmus is located2. Heaney’s naming of 
the plays after the setting and the action that occurs there is indicative of the 
importance of social and symbolic structures in his interpretation of these 
Greek texts, and more importantly, as I will argue, the effect of their 
transgression. 
 
Central to these plays, whether they are interpreted as simply versions 
of ancient Greek drama, or ethical evaluations of crime and punishment, is 
the idea that as a genre, poetry can inhabit a symbolic space where an 
alternative reality can be articulated. For Heaney, it is imperative to be aware 
of tradition and the past, but not to be bound by it, because to do so would 
make progress and change impossible. This essay seeks to examine the site 
of poetry in Heaney’s aesthetic philosophy and its relationship to poststructuralist 
theoretical concepts. 
 
In The Cure at Troy, the chorus illustrates how art can present an 
alternative perspective on reality. It is completely fluid, both imaginatively and 
performatively, interjecting on behalf of the modern audience and the 
temporally and geographically specific public of the play’s ancient setting. 
The chorus leader even moves between gender positions, as she is a woman 
at the beginning of the play, but becomes a man at the end, speaking as 
Hercules. This ability of poetry to be ‘a break with the usual life but not 
absconding from it’ (Heaney 2002, 208) contrasts sharply with the characters 
of the play, who like people in the real world, are hopelessly structured by 
social codes: ‘people so stanch and true they’re fixated’ (Heaney 1990, 1). 
They are tied down to tradition and custom, and like the women who are 
punished for attacking Orpheus at the end of The Midnight Verdict, they 
behave 
as a caught bird struggles to get free 
From a cunningly set snare, but still can only 
Tighten the mesh around its feet still tighter 
The more it strains its wings and frets and flutters (Heaney 1993, 41). 
Poetry differs from these, because it is ideally unfettered by ideological and 
political allegiances, but sensitive to them, as the description of the chorus 
makes clear: 
I hate it, I always hated it, and I am 
A part of it myself. 
And a part of you, 
For my part is the chorus, and the chorus, 
Is more or less a borderline between 
The you and the me and the it of it. (Heaney 1990, 2) 
Poetry is both of the world and not of the world; it is born from the language 
and created by the context of the culture from which it emerges, but is in 
itself a threshold to an alternate reality. In his Nobel lecture, Heaney remarks 
on the ability of poetry to provide ‘not only a surprising variation played upon 
the world, but a re-tuning of the world itself’ (Heaney 1995, 16). Hence, its 
position on the circumference of reality allows poetry to not only alter the 
presentation of the concrete facts of existence, but to radically re-recreate 
and re-imagine those facts. The instrument that is being re-tuned is 
language, and as Lacanian psychoanalysis verifies, language is not simply a 
vehicle for articulating ideas already present in a nascent fashion, it actively 
structures thought and defines subjectivity itself. Lacan’s most significant 
departure from Freud is in his inter-meshing of linguistics, philosophy and 
psychoanalysis to produce a theory of the subject. Language is at the centre 
of his theory, and he regards the symbolic order as the most influential factor 
in the development of the subject. In Écrits, he states that, ‘the slightest 
alteration in the relation between man and the signifier … changes the whole 
course of history by modifying the moorings that anchor his being (Lacan 
1989, 192). Consequently, the ability to re-tune the instrument of language 
means that the poet wields both formative and transformative power. 
In The Cure at Troy, the chorus is represented as a metaphor for 
poetry. In the opening verses, it claims: 
And that’s the borderline that poetry 
operates on too, always in between 
What you would like to happen and what will 
Whether you like it or not. 
Poetry 
Allowed the god to speak. It was the voice 
Of reality and justice (Heaney 1990, 2). 
 
Poetry, in this description, gives access to something beyond the ordinary 
realm of human experience, which here is represented by a god in 
accordance with the religious beliefs apparent in Sophoclean drama. So for 
Heaney, poetry treads the line between what is experientially known, and 
what is on the edge of our systems of law, and language; the limit at which 
social codes become most ambiguous. This is an idea that is articulated in 
almost exactly the same words in ‘The Government of the Tongue’: 
in the rift between what is going to happen and whatever we would wish to 
happen, poetry holds attention for a space … a focus where our power to 
concentrate is concentrated back on ourselves. This is what gives poetry its 
governing power. At its greatest moments it would attempt, in Yeats’s 
phrase to hold in a single thought reality and justice (Heaney 2002, 208). 
 
These quotations from Heaney’s drama and prose elucidate the contradictory 
dualisms that make up his definition of poetry: it is affiliated to both society 
and the individual, with its primary loyalty vested in the artistic event itself; it 
is concerned with driving towards future aspirations, but is tied to the social 
structures that bind and shape; it can incorporate the grim immovability of 
reality with a fantastical ideal. It is in the midst of these conflicting forces 
that the dramatic action in The Cure at Troy is situated. 
 
At the beginning of the play, the main conflict appears to be the 
tension between duty to the show allegiance to the community by acting in 
accordance with moral and ethical norms, and the right of the individual to 
act independently of these codes of behaviour. The play provides a 
dramatisation of Heaney’s maxim that poetry should be ‘true to the impact of 
external reality and ... sensitive to the inner laws of the poet’s being’ (Heaney 
1995, 16). Odysseus appeals to Neopthalmus’s need to belong community 
and his sense of duty to it, when he convinces him to deceive Philoctetes in 
order to obtain his magical bow, and thus win the battle to take Troy. 
Acknowledging Neopthalmus’s desire to emulate his father, he argues that 
duty to the community over-rides personal or familial loyalties. Although 
Neopthalmus is admittedly noble and strong, his ‘father’s son’, he is 
reminded: ‘if parts of this brief seems puzzling to you, /Just remember, you’re 
here to serve our cause’ (Heaney 1990, 6). Odysseus regards loyalty to the 
hierarchy of the community to be a valid reason for committing Philoctetes to 
ten years exile on the island of Lemnos, where he and the newly recruited 
Neopthalmus eventually confront him: ‘I left Philoctetes here / Marooned him 
– but / only because I had been ordered to’ (Heaney 1990, 3). Later in the 
play, when after a crisis of conscience Neopthalmus decides to be truthful to 
Philoctetes about his mission, he holds steadfast to his duty and refuses to 
return the bow that he has won from him under false pretences: ‘There’s a 
cause, a plan, big moves, / And I’m part of them. I’m under orders’ (Heaney 
1990, 51). 
 
According to Philoctetes however, the persona that Neopthalmus 
adopts in order to accede to social codes of behaviour is false, and he pleads 
with him, ‘O son, be yourself again. This isn’t you’ (Heaney 1990, 52). He 
tells the chorus that ‘the only real thing is the thing he lives for: / His own self 
respect’ (Heaney 1990, 52). When Odysseus arrives on the scene, there is an 
emotional tug of war between him and Philoctetes, with Neopthalmus in the 
middle. Philoctetes claims that he brings out his innate inclination to honesty, 
whereas Odysseus makes him follow orders blindly: ‘With you he does what 
he is told, with me he did what his nature told him’ (Heaney 1990, 56). The 
influence of both men on Neopthalmus is portrayed as the collision between 
personal individuation and social submission. But Neopthalmus, when under 
the influence of Philoctetes, can be no freer than he is under the orders of 
Odysseus. And so Neopthalmus appeals to an authority greater than either 
his personal freedom or his duty to the community when he returns the bow 
to Philoctetes, telling Odysseus that ‘The jurisdiction I am under here / Is 
justice herself. She isn’t only Greek’ (Heaney 1990, 67). In Derrida’s essay 
‘On Forgiveness’, he professes the transcendent quality of forgiveness, itself 
intimately linked with justice, in the same way as Neopthalmus does: 
The proliferation of scenes of repentance or of asking ‘forgiveness’, signifies, 
no doubt, a universal urgency of memory: it is necessary to turn toward the 
past; and it is necessary to take this act of memory, of self-accusation, of 
‘repentance’, of appearance [comparution] at the same time beyond the 
juridicial instance, or that of the Nation-State (Derrida 2001, 28). 
This site outside of personal and social conventions, codes and structures, is 
where Heaney locates his poetry. Poetry is part of the individual and of 
society, but as he states, ‘The fact is that poetry is its own reality, and no 
matter how much a poet may concede to the corrective pressures of social, 
moral, political and historical reality, the ultimate fidelity must be to the 
demands and the promise of the artistic event’ (Heaney 2002, 200). Just as 
Neopthalmus ultimately decides that his loyalty must lie outside of social and 
personal considerations in the realm of justice, Heaney argues that poetry 
inhabits a space that connects with reality, but is also removed from it. For 
Heaney, poetry is like Neopthalmus’ appeal to ‘Justice herself’, because it is 
capable of articulating an innate and personal sense of rightness, even if this 
instinct contravenes social mores. It possesses ‘the power to persuade that 
vulnerable part of our consciousness of its rightness in spite of the evidence 
of wrongness all around it’ (Heaney 1995, 29). 
 
Derrida also locates the defining principle of justice beyond 
conventional social law. In ‘On Forgiveness’, he comments on the concept of 
the imprescriptible3, a reference to a type of crime so abhorrent that the 
punishment is has no specified duration. The most interesting aspect of the 
imprescriptible is the characteristic it shares with its opposite, forgiveness, 
that of being situated in a realm outside of tangible reality. The 
imprescriptible, he states, ‘stems perhaps from what it also introduces, like 
forgiveness or the unforgiveable, a sort of eternity or transcendence, the 
apocalyptic horizon of a final judgement: in the law beyond the law, in history 
beyond history’ (Derrida 2001, 32). The imprescriptible, like the idealistic 
concept of forgiveness, is not an abberant part of the system of justice: 
rather it is the transcendental signifier; the exception that paradoxically 
ensures the viability of the system. The only thing that needs forgiving is the 
act that is unforgiveable claims Derrida, which is why forgiveness is 
essentially impossible. And yet, it must exist as an aspiration in order for any 
thinking about forgiveness or justice to take place. In the same way, the 
imprescriptible is carried beyond the existence of the life of the criminal, the 
victim or those who sentence the punishment, but exists in order to 
differentiate those heinous imprescriptible crimes from other, lesser offences. 
Derrida notes that in the USA, the Presidents and governors have the right of 
grace: the right to pardon. He states that ‘this exception from the law, the 
exception to the law, is situated at the summit or at the foundation of the 
juridico-political … the transcendental principle of a system doesn’t belong to 
the system. It is foreign to it as an exception’ (Derrida 2001, 46). So, pardon 
is intrinsic to punishment, just as the unforgiveable is intrinsic to forgiveness. 
The unforgiveable, the imprescriptible, the pardon, all operate outside of the 
normal systems that humans exist in as social beings. In The Cure at Troy, 
the existence of this separate sphere of exception and impossibility is made 
evident when, amidst the tension between personal morality and social duty, 
the appeal to justice appears. The relationship between the real world and 
poetry, as Heaney describes it, is like that of these exceptions: poetry is part 
of it, but also outside of it. 
 
At the end of The Cure at Troy, the chorus stipulates the limited role of 
art in influencing the violence of the real world: ‘No poem or play or song / 
Can fully right a wrong / Inflicted and endured’ (Heaney 1990, 77). But they 
go on to state that, 
…once in a lifetime 
The longed-for tidal wave 
Of justice can rise up 
And hope and history rhyme 
Poetry may not change reality, but it offers a way of re-imagining reality, 
which is the first stage of any practical change. The assertion ends the play 
in symmetry by recalling the opening lines of the chorus that situate poetry 
on the borderline in between ‘What you would like to happen [hope] and 
what will [history]’ (Heaney 1990, 2). This orientation towards the future is 
evident from the title of the Heaney’s translation: The Cure at Troy. The 
action takes place on the island of Lemnos, not Troy, and Philoctetes has not 
been cured by the end of the play. Hercules, through the voice of the chorus, 
tells him to go and find Asclepius, who will ‘make you whole, / Relieve your 
body and your soul’ (Heaney 1990, 79). Philoctetes’ ‘cure’ is but a hope of 
cure when the play ends: it is the ideal outcome that must negotiate with the 
actual outcome. Poetry’s strength, its gift, is that it can incorporate one into 
the other, juggle ‘what you would like to happen and what will’ (Heaney 
1990, 2); and this is ‘the promise’ of the artistic event, to which I have 
already referred. And of course, a promise is orientated towards the future, 
in the unknowable beyond of the present. 
 
Heaney’s later translation, The Burial at Thebes, shares some 
characteristics with The Cure at Troy. In the case of the former, the space 
beyond poetry and symbolic codes of behaviour is symbolized by a moment in 
the action of the play itself, when Antigone is sentenced to be walled into a 
tomb as punishment for the crime committed by paying respects to her 
brother’s dead body. Lacan’s commentary on Antigone illuminates the 
significance of this scene, in a manner that I will argue is analogous to the 
site where Heaney situates the place of poetry. Lacan is adamant that in 
opposition to the Hegelian viewpoint, Sophocles’ Antigone is not simply about 
the clash between two different discourses, one of law and one of sibling 
duty. In fact, Lacan’s interpretation of the play does not locate the play’s 
nexus in a debate on ethics or morality, even though it appears in the 
seminar entitled The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Instead, his most significant 
intervention into the analysis of the figure of Antigone is in establishing her 
position beyond the realm of any such human considerations, when he 
describes how she crosses over into the second death. Žižek gives an 
interesting insight into the position of the seminar in the overall context of 
Lacan’s output, which provides a parallel to Heaney’s growing interest in 
translation in later years. He describes the early Lacanian seminars as 
structuralist; a style of theory critical of the decay of symbolic authority. The 
next phase of his work, of which Antigone is a part, displays an interest in 
transgressing symbolic authority, and is, he maintains, ‘Lacan’s reaction to the 
first cracks which appeared in the solid edifice of post-World War II French 
society’ (Žižek 2001, 30). Likewise, the early Heaney collections such as 
Death of a Naturalist, Door into the Dark, Wintering Out and North exhibit an 
interest in the local socio-cultural context in which Heaney writes; it would be 
possible to say that Heaney is to a large extent work within his 
geographically-situated symbolic order in these texts. However, Heaney’s 
later writing shows an increasing interest in expanding and transgressing this 
local symbolic into wider literary contexts in terms of geography and history, 
which is evident in translations such as The Midnight Verdict, Laments, 
Beowulf and Sweeney Astray. In this way, the path of his writing career follows 
a broadly similar trajectory to that of Lacan. 
 
To situate the boundary transgression of Antigone, Lacan makes 
recourse to a characteristic of tragic heroes in general, before discussing their 
role in the plays of Sophocles in particular: tragic heroes, according to Lacan, 
‘are always isolated, they are always beyond established limits, always in an 
exposed position and, as a result, [are] separated in one way or another from 
the structure’ (Lacan 1992, 271). In Sophoclean drama, this characteristic of 
the tragic hero is taken to an even greater extreme, as all the heroes of the 
extant plays (with the possible exception of Oedipus Rex), enter into the play 
when ‘the race is run’ (Lacan 1992, 273). By this, Lacan means that the 
events which will combine to create the hero’s downfall have already been set 
in motion at the beginning, and all that remains is to see the hero’s fall being 
played out on the stage4. In The Burial at Thebes, Polyneices has died before 
the play begins. The edict that his body his to be left for the birds to pick at 
has been issued, and Antigone has already decided what she will do, a 
decision she never considers repealing for a moment during the play: 
I’ll go down to the underworld 
Hand in hand with my brother. 
And I’ll go with my head held high. 
The gods will be proud of me. 
The land of the living, sister, 
Is neither here nor there 
We enter it and we leave it. 
The dead in the land of the dead 
Are the ones you’ll be with longest (Heaney 2004, 6). 
Here, Heaney emphasises Antigone’s death wish: she seems to embrace the 
prospect of dying and exhibits no fear of it whatsoever. Moreover, he 
anticipates her situation between the land of the living and the land of the 
dead, which is so crucial for Lacan’s interpretation. According to Lacan, 
Antigone’s decision goes beyond the laws of men and is in accordance only 
with an unwritten law, which is ‘a horizon determined by a structural relation’ 
(Lacan 1992, 278). In other words, it is a place known only for its situation 
outside of the language and social laws of living beings. She states: 
The proclamation had your force behind it 
But it was a mortal force, and I, also a mortal, 
I chose to disregard it. I abide 
By statutes utter and immutable – 
Unwritten, original, god-given laws (Heaney 2004, 21). 
It is in this way different from Creon’s notion of law, even the law of the 
gods, which is tangible and can be known. He shows that he pertains to 
know the will of the gods when he scoffingly asks, referring to Polyneices, 
‘The gods, you think, will side with the likes of him?’ (Heaney 2004, 14). 
 
Antigone, on the other hand, freely admits that unwritten laws of the Gods 
may not be those known by the populace. Lacan suggests that in the 
absence of any other vocabulary, Antigone identifies the place where her 
rules are written with the gods, but in the modern era, this concept has been 
replaced by the Christian God, in religious terms, and by the second death, in 
psychoanalytic terms5. As the second death is identified by Lacan as being in 
the realm of the Other (Lacan 1992, 277), this beyond is the beyond of 
language and the symbolic. It is perhaps too, to this beyond of language 
that Neopthalmus appeals to when he makes his claim on Justice, because it 
is evidently not a type of justice known to the Greeks, and does not exist 
within his social or cultural context. 
 
So, Antigone does not persist in law-breaking only for the glory in the 
eyes of the gods. In fact, the only justification she gives for her actions in the 
play has puzzled many scholars. She claims that the punishment she is 
willing to undergo for the sake of paying respect to Polyneices’ body, would 
not be undertaken by her for another: 
Not for a husband, not even for a son 
Would I have broken the law. 
Another husband I could always find 
And have other sons by him if one were lost. 
But with my father and my mother gone, 
Where can I find another brother, ever? (Heaney 2004, 40) 
 
Antigone’s justification for her action is the irreplaceability of her brother as a 
unit in the structural relationships of family. Moreover, her willingness to die 
for him is based on his being, as separate from the actions of his life – if he 
were to be judged by the latter, he would not deserve such a sacrifice. Lacan 
maintains that Antigone would not be able to separate Polyneices’ being from 
his doings, were it not for language. It is language that creates a split in the 
subject from childhood when it is first acquired. This causes a rift between 
the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enounced; the ‘I’ who 
articulates and the ‘I’ who is consequently articulated in language, shaped 
and moulded by its structures. He goes on to state: ‘that separation of being 
from the characteristics of the historical drama he had lived through, is 
precisely the limit or the ex nihilo to which Antigone is attached. It is nothing 
more than the break that the very presence of language inaugurates in the 
life of man’ (Lacan 1992, 279). Lacan argues that when Antigone is walled up 
in the tomb, her justification for the actions that led her there evidence the 
split subjectivity of the individual that Lacan elaborates and develops 
throughout his whole career. She represents ‘the relationship of the human 
being to that of … the signifying cut that confers on him the indomitable 
power of being’ (Lacan 1992, 282). In other words, the individual makes a 
transaction when language is acquired: the ability to operate in the social 
sphere is granted in exchange for the fullness of being that is only 
experienced by the pre-linguistic child. Language introduces a split or a cut in 
the individual, and it is this universal human wound that Antigone embodies 
for Lacan. 
 
Moreover, her physical incarceration in the tomb, when she is alive but 
waiting for inevitable death, also bears witness to the effect of language on 
the subject, and Lacan explains this through the concept of Atè. This word, 
he tells us, can be translated as misfortune although it only seems like 
misfortune from the outside, and it can also be found in the word ‘atrocious’6. 
Atè is reached when Antigone pursues her desire until it is outside of the 
realms of what is human, so her destruction is therefore self-willed and not 
externally manipulated. As Creon states: ‘It was she / Who put herself 
beyond the pale. She is to blame / For every blackout stone they pile up 
round her’ (Heaney 2004, 40). Atè can be thought of as a dividing line that 
Antigone passes over when she has accepted that her life must come to an 
end, and before she physically dies, which is why this part of Lacan’s seminar 
is entitled ‘Antigone Between the Two Deaths’ (Lacan 1992, 271). When she 
is walled up in the tomb, she gives a long speech. She will certainly soon die 
and is the ‘still living corpse’ (Lacan 1992, 268) like the figures of Niobe and 
Danae (Heaney 2004, 37, 42) with whom Antigone is compared in the play. 
She exists, briefly, having stepped outside the boundaries of symbolic law, 
but her being is without the support of the symbolic, and so she must die: it 
is, as Žižek states, ‘the heroic suicidal transgressive gesture which excludes 
the subject from the symbolic community’ (Žižek 2001, 29). It is a separation 
of being from meaning in the same way that Antigone thinks of Polyneices 
after his death: after Atè, Antigone enters a realm where she is outside of 
symbolic law, and so she experiences a symbolic death, which is soon 
followed by her actual death. This is why Lacan states that, ‘Atè concerns the 
Other, the field of the other’ (Lacan 1992, 277), because crossing Atè means 
that symbolic law has been violated, and the ability to be part of the symbolic 
community, granted when language is acquired, is taken away. Here, Lacan 
shows that language itself is more important than any other social structure – 
gods, God, law, ethics, all fall under its power. It is this mighty power that 
Heaney would attempt to re-tune in accordance with his poetic philosophy. 
The Lacanian theory of the subject isolates language as the cause of 
split subjectivity and of the insatiable desire that ensues as a result; desire 
that passes from object to object like endless links in the signifying chain, 
unable to find a sense of completeness because that completeness has been 
exchanged for language itself. The importance of language and symbolic law 
is also attested to in Heaney’s translation when the chorus state: 
Among the many wonders of the world, 
Where is the equal of this creature, man … 
The wind is no more swift or mysterious 
Than his mind and his words; he has mastered thinking, 
Roofed his house against hail and rain 
And worked out laws for living together (Heaney 2004, 16-17) 
 
The place beyond Atè in the realm of the second death, the place where 
being is detatched from meaning, can be regarded as a symbol of the splitting 
effect of language. Just as Derrida shows the imprescriptible crime to be the 
transcendental signifier of justice, so too does Lacan show the second death 
to be the transcendental signifier of human life. Heaney similarly locates the 
poetic impetus in a location beyond chthonic concerns, in a space that is like 
that of the second death, where language is dislocated from reality, and the 
cords of symbolic bindings are loosened. Žižek states that the space between 
the two deaths is between ‘the symbolic and the real’ and points out that this 
was later theorized by Lacan as ‘lamella, the undead-indestructible object, 
Life deprived of support in the symbolic order’ (Žižek 1999, 155). 
 
A similar act of transgression, and temporary lack of regard for 
symbolic structures, is part of the artistic philosophy of Heaney, who does not 
wish his poetry to be entirely fettered by social and political considerations. 
Perhaps this is why in ‘The Redress of Poetry’, Heaney separates the poetic 
sphere from lived experience, saying that the nobility of poetry ‘is the 
imagination pressing back against the pressure of reality’ (Heaney 2001, 281). 
And of course, the act of transgression committed by Antigone is precisely 
what leads her to the second death; that place between the symbolic of 
human life and the real of death. Heaney’s translation emphasises the 
expulsion that will result if an individual steps too far outside of symbolic law: 
But let him once 
Overstep what the city allows, 
Tramp down right or treat the law 
Wilfully, as his own word, 
Then let this wonder of the world remember: 
He’ll have put himself beyond the pale. 
When he comes begging, we’ll turn our backs. 
 
Although, as the fate of Antigone verifies, it is a dangerous act when taken to 
extremes, for Heaney, poetry is located outside of social, political and even 
moral codes; it emerges from the individual who desires, a desire instigated 
by the first words that are spoken, Freud’s ‘fort/ da’, which create and divide 
reality, and simultaneously create and divide the speaking subject. It emerges 
from the individual who desires justice, and is courageous enough to imagine 
a new way of thinking, like Antigone who is willing to die for her brother’s 
right to have his corpse treated with respect, and like Polyneices, who casts 
aside Greek conceptions of justice and creates his own. Poetry is something 
that goes beyond the symbolic, but not into the Lacanian real, since after 
language, the real can only be accessed by death. This beyond of justice 
created by poetry is at the outer limits of the symbolic order, just as Derrida’s 
notions of the imprescriptible crime and the pardon are at the edge of 
juridical and legal systems, and the transcendental signifiers of them. Like 
these, poetry is the radical exception to reality, and because of this, it has the 
power to alter reality. ‘How does the real get into the made up?’ / Ask me an 
easier one’ (Heaney 2001, 21), the poet persona states in ‘Known World’. 
It may be the case that by its very fictional nature, poetry brings us 
closer to truths about life than factual discussion ever can. Like clemency to 
punishment, fiction is the exception to fact, to reality, but it may be the 
exception that proves the rule. As Žižek claims, ‘truth has the structure of a 
fiction’: truth is condemned to remain a fiction precisely in so far as the 
immovable Real eludes its grasp’ (Žižek 1999, 167). In other words, the 
structure of the symbolic denies the subject fullness of meaning, and so the 
truth itself is de facto a fiction, and can arguably be presented most 
accurately as such. Heaney would seem to agree because he writes that ‘The 
paradox of the arts is that they are all made up and yet they allow us to get 
at truths about who and what we are or might be’ (Heaney 2002, 73). Just 
as Lacan’s signifying cut that Antigone represents in the realm of the second 
death is beyond the symbolic, but is also the transcendental signifier of it, it 
would not be unreasonable to claim that poetry as Heaney defines it, outside 
of society, politics and morality in the real world, is the transcendental 
signifier of reality itself. 
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1 Epigraph is taken from ‘The Fragment’ in Electric Light, p. 57. 
2 Although the play is originally named after Philoctetes, the character who is left stranded on the 
island of Lemnos, it is Neopthalmus who must face the dilemma of whether to obey his orders and 
duty, or to tell the truth and be faithful to his personal morality. 
3 Derrida notes that in 1964, a law was passed in France judging crimes against humanity to be 
imprescriptible. 
4 In his discussion of the heroes of Sophoclean drama, Lacan describes how in Ajax, Electra, 
Philoctetes and to an extent Oedipus Rex, the ingredients for the hero’s demise are present from the 
beginning: ‘the trajectories that are set in motion have only to come crashing down on top of one 
another as best they can’ (Lacan 1992, 271). Oedipus at Colonus is mentioned but there is no 
description of how it fits into this pattern. 
5 Lacan states that ‘we Christians have erased the whole sphere of the gods. And we are in fact, here 
interested in that which we have replaced it with as illuminated by psychoanalysis’. He goes on to 
says that ‘it is something I have begun to define as the limit of the second death’ (Lacan 1992, 260). 
6 In the seminar, Lacan mentions that Atè can be found in the word ‘atrocious’ and that it can be 
translated as misfortune, ‘but it doesn’t have anything to do with misfortune. It is this meaning that is 
assigned by doubtless implacable gods, as she might say, which renders her pitiless and fearless’ 
(Lacan 1992, 263-4). 
